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Abstract  
 
Security is a concern that must be taken into consideration starting from the early stages of system development. Over 
the last two decades, researchers and engineers have developed a considerable number of methods for security 
requirements engineering. Some of them rely on the (re) use of security knowledge. Despite some existing surveys about 
security requirements engineering, there is not yet any reference for researchers and practitioners that presents in a 
systematic way the existing proposals, techniques, and tools related to security knowledge reuse in security requirements 
engineering. 
The aim of this paper is to fill this gap by looking into drawing a picture of the literature on knowledge and reuse in 
security requirements engineering. The questions we address are related to methods, techniques, modeling frameworks, 
and tools for and by reuse in security requirements engineering. We address these questions through a systematic mapping 
study. The mapping study was a literature review conducted with the goal of identifying, analyzing and categorizing state 
of the art research on our topic. This mapping study analyzes more than thirty approaches, covering twenty years of 
research in security requirements engineering. The contributions can be summarized as follows: (i) a framework was 
defined for analyzing and comparing the different proposals as well as categorizing future contributions related to 
knowledge reuse and security requirements engineering; (ii) the different forms of knowledge representation and reuse 
were identified; and (iii) previous surveys were updated. We conclude that most methods should introduce more reusable 
knowledge to manage security requirements. 
 
Keywords: reusability, security requirements, knowledge, ontologies, patterns, templates.   
1. Introduction and motivation 
 
There is a clear trend nowadays to consider systems security at the requirements engineering stage. Formerly, security 
requirements were considered as technical choices made during implementation, resulting in late and expensive attempts 
to shoehorn security into the system in progress. This is particularly true with Information Systems (IS). Security 
Requirements Engineering (SRE) allows IS developers to predict the threats, their consequences and countermeasures 
before a system is in place, rather than as a reaction to possibly disastrous attacks [1]. SRE is concerned with protecting 
assets from harm [2]. To cope with these issues, an increasing number of publications, conference tracks, and workshops 
in recent years point out the growing interest of researchers and practitioners in providing SRE processes with various 
frameworks and methods. Some of them are extensions of goal-oriented approaches, like Secure i* [3], Secure Tropos 
[4], KAOS, and anti-models [5]. Others are built on the object paradigm, mainly UML-based, such as misuse cases [6], 
security use cases [7] , Secure UML [8] and UMLSec [9].  
At a high level of abstraction, every application tends to have the same basic kinds of vulnerable assets (e.g., data, 
communications, services, hardware components, and personnel). Similarly, these vulnerable assets tend to be subject to 
the same basic kinds of security threats (e.g., theft, vandalism, unauthorized disclosure, destruction, fraud, extortion, 
espionage, etc.) from attacks by the same basic kinds of attackers (e.g., hackers, crackers, disgruntled employees, 
international cyber terrorists, industrial spies, etc.) who can be profiled with motivations and their typical levels of 
expertise and tools. Furthermore, security requirements tend to be even more standardized than their associated 
mechanisms. For example, to address the identification and authentication requirements, one may have several choices 
of architectural mechanisms beyond user ID and passwords [10]. Based on these facts, reuse of requirements could lead 
to significant savings in development time and cost [11]. Nowadays, the research community in SRE as well as 
practitioners has a vague idea of existing literature for handling knowledge reuse among existing SRE approaches. For 
instance, a quick research indicates that some of the approaches propose a catalog of attacks [12], while others rely on 
patterns [13]. However, a systematic mapping study and analysis of existing security requirements engineering methods 
that make (re)use of knowledge is still lacking.  
This paper presents a structured and systematic mapping study of several articles related to knowledge reuse and security 
requirements engineering from the last two decades.  
The goals of this research can be summarized as follows: (i) to update existing literature surveys related to SRE with 
recent researches, (ii) to identify the (re)used knowledge in SRE, (iii) to distinguish the different types of knowledge reuse 
 2 
structures in SRE, and (iv) to understand their use. Our research method considers the state-of-the-art in security 
requirements literature. More specifically, this mapping study must find answers to the following questions: Do the 
security requirements engineering methods rely on reusability of knowledge? What are the reusable elements? How are 
they represented, modeled? How are they (re)used? Are the knowledge-based approaches tool-supported? 
A framework was defined to understand the different proposals and classify new contributions in the future. Over 100 
proposals were analyzed from which the paper reports the knowledge reuse situation of 30 methods.   
The main target audiences of this mapping study are researchers and especially PhD students in the field of security 
requirements, but also tool developers or practitioners who are interested in the field.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a short introduction to knowledge reuse in security requirements 
engineering. Section 3 gives an overview of our research method. Section 4 presents the process and results of the 
conducted systematic mapping study to get an overview of existing security requirements approaches based on knowledge 
reuse. Section 5 summarizes the results and answers the research questions. Section 6 reports the related works. Section 
7 discusses threats to validity of our mapping study. Finally, Section 8 concludes this paper.  
 
2. Knowledge reuse in security requirements engineering  
 
Back in 1993, the second International Workshop on Software Reusability was held in Lucca, Italy. Most of the papers 
presented at this event focused on reusing code, design or architecture. In other words, the thinking was that mainly the 
hard artifacts—code, object, and so on—could be reused. Very few papers looked at the idea of reuse earlier in the IS life 
cycle, namely reusing requirements themselves. Active areas of reuse research in the past twenty years include reuse 
libraries, domain engineering methods and tools; reuse design, design patterns, domain specific software architecture, 
software componentry [14], generators, measurement, and experimentation [15]. 
Nowadays, the practice of reuse is moving upstream and reuse is also concerned with more abstract artifacts. 
Requirements are commonly recycled; patterns are exchanged on the Internet. The notion of reuse at the requirements 
stage is largely accepted by many within the community as a desirable aim [16]. For instance, a working conference on 
patterns (Pattern Languages of Programs) is held twice a year and results in the sharing of knowledge and publication of 
new patterns [17].    
Requirement reuse can be defined as either taking requirements that have been written for previous projects and then 
using them for a new project, or writing requirements from scratch at a reasonable level of generality and abstraction in 
order to use them over different projects. For instance, it is possible to reuse different types of data, ranging from business 
requirements and functional requirements to use cases and test cases. Since requirements engineering is the first phase in 
the software development process, requirements reuse can empower the software life cycle. Previous research [18] has 
pointed out that reusing the first software products and processes implemented in a development project can have an 
impact on the life cycle from two basic points of view: (a) allowing the software development resources to be more 
proﬁtable, and (b) promoting reuse-based development across the entire software process. 
During the last decade, given the common nature of security problems across applications and application domains, 
researchers paid some attention to the benefits of reuse in SRE process [10]. Security knowledge is hard to acquire. In 
addition to awareness about potential attacks, designing security-critical systems requires knowledge and security 
expertise in various fields such as computer networks, operating systems, communication protocols, cryptography 
algorithms, and access control methods. Reuse combined with predefined structured knowledge can make the job of 
requirements engineers much easier and faster, since they usually lack security expertise and skills. However, one should 
be careful when structuring reusable knowledge – it has to be of a high quality. Otherwise it might end up introducing 
new security problems. A clear distinction must be made between engineering “for” reuse and engineering “by” reuse 
[111]. 
Structuring security knowledge helps the knowledge consumer to browse the content and to find the relevant information 
more efficiently. Different knowledge representations exist in the literature. Patterns of recurring attacks and 
vulnerabilities have been identified by longtime software security practitioners [19]. Security templates of a high level of 
abstraction were also introduced for reuse purposes [10]. Various other approaches for managing security knowledge and 
reuse exist in the literature, such as taxonomies, ontologies, standards, and guidelines. 
 
3. Research method 
 
A fair amount of publications, conference tracks and workshops in SRE appeared during the last decade, revealing a 
steady interest of both researchers and practitioners in that domain. Unfortunately, it remains difficult to have more than 
a vague idea about what is available in terms of reuse of security requirements, and to position research with respect to 
available practices in order to choose appropriate practice.  One difficulty is due to the fact that these issues are addressed 
by several communities: the requirements engineering community, the software engineering community, the information 
systems community, and the computer security community. 
Our research method aimed at analyzing and identifying the available literature on security requirements research, and 
categorizing it in a systematic way. The Systematic MAPping study (SMAP) was conducted between August 2013 and 
December 2013. We applied the mapping studies guidelines proposed by Petersen et al. [20], which compares the methods 
used in mapping studies and systematic literature reviews. The SMAP reported in this paper was performed based on 
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these guidelines (cf. Figure 1), to identify questions and answers raised by the research community on knowledge (re)use 
in SRE.  
 
Reviewing existing research in a fully objective way is not possible. A systematic study, such as the one outlined in Figure 
1, however makes the process less subjective by using pre-defined data forms and criteria that narrow the scope for 
personal interpretation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mapping studies must be distinguished from systematic literature reviews in several ways. Systematic Literature Reviews 
(SLR) have been defined as “a means of identifying, evaluating and interpreting all available research relevant to a 
particular research question, or topic area, or phenomenon of interest” [21]. Mapping studies are a special kind of SLR 
that use the same basic methodology as SLRs but aim to identify and classify all research related to a broad software 
engineering topic rather than answering questions about the relative merits of competing technologies as addressed by 
conventional SLRs [109] [22]. SMAPs are intended to provide an overview of a topic area and identify whether there are 
sub-topics with sufficient primary studies to conduct conventional SLRs and also to identify sub-topics where more 
primary studies are needed. 
 
Overall, the main phases of our systematic mapping study were: defining research questions, conducting the search for 
relevant papers, screening  papers, key wording of abstracts, extracting data, planning mapping, conducting, and reporting. 
Figure 1 presents the process structure of our SMAP.   
 
A key element, in the guidelines proposed by Petersen et al. [20], is the definition of the research questions (research 
scope). Research questions should reflect and reply to the main goals of a SMAP in providing an overview of a research 
area, identify the quantity and type of research and results available within it. The search for primary studies (all papers) 
is conducted thanks to search strings on scientific databases or browsing manually through relevant conference 
proceedings or journal publications. We performed screening of papers for inclusion and exclusion (relevant papers). In 
this step, inclusion and exclusion criteria are used to exclude studies that are not relevant to answer the research questions. 
Key wording using abstracts is a way to reduce the time needed in developing the classification scheme and ensuring that 
the scheme takes the existing studies into account. The process ends up with the data extraction and mapping of studies; 
here the classification scheme evolves by adding new categories or mapping and splitting existing categories. More 
practical details on how we addressed these issues in our SMAP are given in the next section. 
 
 
4. Reusable security knowledge: a systematic mapping study  
 
The review includes publications reporting on existing approaches and tools as well as publications discussing research 
issues for security requirements and knowledge reuse in SRE. The SMAP was conducted in 24 relevant sources (the 
detailed list of the sources can be consulted in the cell “Digital library/resource” in Table 4 in the appendix). The total 
retrieved number of publications is 158 using well-defined search criteria (which will be presented later). From these 158 
publications, 95 papers were chosen for further analyses based on our set of selection criteria. The complete list of all 95 
retrieved publications and details about the retrieved searches can be found in the Appendix (Table 4). 
 
4.1. Conducting the systematic mapping study  
 
The main goal for conducting the systematic mapping study was to get an extensive overview of existing knowledge 
based approaches and tools for security requirements engineering and to understand key issues for security requirements 
elicitation and analysis considering the (re)use of knowledge in these practices. This systematic mapping study was 
developed using the following elements:  
 
A. Definition of research questions 
Our previous research led us to the conclusion that we need to reinforce security requirements engineering by enriching 
the process with specific knowledge on security. This knowledge is necessary to take into account security requirements 
Figure 1.  The systematic mapping process carried out in this paper, applied from [20] 
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early and consistently. It is generally not well known by information systems designers. Hence, we want to understand 
the current state-of-the-art in this field. More specifically, we want to evaluate if the security knowledge can be reused 
(RQ1). A deep analysis of this question requires that we elicit how this knowledge is represented (RQ2) and reused (RQ3). 
Moreover, can the whole knowledge be reused (RQ4)? Can it be reused automatically (RQ5)? Finally, what can be 
improved in current approaches (RQ6)? RQ2, RQ3, RQ4, RQ5 and RQ6 only make sense if RQ1 is answerable and if the 
answer is yes. RQ2, RQ3, RQ4 and RQ5 are necessary to understand which knowledge is currently reused and RQ6 
sketches avenues for our future research. Thus, our systematic review was guided by the following research questions, 
for each SRE method, and for SRE methods overall: 
 
RQ1. Does the security requirements engineering method rely on reusable security knowledge? How many 
papers handled knowledge reuse in SRE?   (Knowledge reliance)  
RQ2. How is the reused knowledge represented? What are the proportions of each knowledge representation 
form?  (Form of representation) 
RQ3. What are the techniques for (re)using the knowledge and their proportion? (Technique) 
RQ4. What are the main reused elements and their proportion? (Reusable knowledge)  
RQ5. Is it tool-supported? Are there many tools for SRE overall? (Automation) 
RQ6. What are the new challenges regarding security knowledge (re)use in SRE?   
 
Research Question RQ1 checks, among the different existing proposals, whether the security engineering method at hand 
relies on the (re)use of knowledge. It also looks for the number of papers that rely on the (re)use of knowledge. RQ2 finds 
how (and how much) the (re)used knowledge is represented (modeling language, representation of requirements, etc.). 
RQ3 identifies how the security knowledge is (re)used. RQ4 reports what the main reusable elements found in proposals 
identified in RQ1 are: for instance, security requirements, threat models, or common vulnerabilities.  RQ5 checks whether 
the SRE method offers automated support for the reuse of knowledge. It also examines the number of papers that propose 
tools for reuse in SRE. Finally, RQ6 extracts from the papers some new challenges that the SRE community should face 
in the future.  
 
B. Search for primary studies 
To search for primary studies (all papers), the sources (presented in the Appendix) were selected based on an analysis 
of security requirements literature. Our sources were extracted from digital libraries such as ACM Digital Library, Science 
Direct, IEEE Xplore, IEEE Computer Society, SpringerLink and DBLP; we chose those because our university had a 
subscription to them. Also journals, conferences, and workshops of the domain such as RE, REFSQ, ARES, Requirements 
Engineering Journal were considered. These sources were chosen based on a pre-search on Google Scholar in addition to 
consulting the citations of existing SLRs and other SMAPs.   Relevant books and reports were explored further. For all 
primary studies found in these sources we also followed their relevant cited references to find additional contributions 
outside the above-mentioned subset. All searches have been conducted on publications appeared between 2000 and 2013, 
thus covering over 13 years of SRE research.  
Depending on the source, different search terms were used. For the more general conferences and for journals we 
used the search terms “reuse security requirements”, “knowledge security requirements”, 
“reusability in security requirements” or “knowledge reusability security 
requirements” appearing in the full-text of the publications (excluding references). In conferences and journals 
related to SRE, the search term was iteratively refined, for example leading to the search terms “ontologies for 
security requirements”, “pattern security requirements”, “reuse misuse cases”, 
“knowledge security use cases” or “reuse secure Tropos”. 
 
C. Screening of papers  
Search for primary studies lead to 158 articles, many of which were irrelevant. Screening for papers based on the 
title and succinct review of the abstract, in addition to the reliance on our inclusion and exclusion criteria, reduced the 
number of relevant papers.  The screening process was performed by two of the authors (team 1) and validated by the 
other two authors (team 2).  
The following restrictions and quality criteria for including/excluding publications were defined: 
 (Restriction R1) The study only includes papers available in electronic form. Books were analyzed based on 
information available online and using the hard copy versions. 
 (Restriction R2) Only publications written in English were included.  
 (Quality criterion Q1) Each publication was checked for completeness. Publications containing several 
unsupported claims or frequently referring to existing work without providing citations were excluded. 
 (Quality criterion Q2) Articles related to the topic of this paper published between 1st January 2000 and 31st 
August 2013 were included: i) papers proposing any method for SRE; ii) papers proposing knowledge reuse 
based methods for SRE; iii) papers proposing automation of any (knowledge reuse based) SRE.  
 (Quality criterion Q3) Works of the same authors with very similar content were included and grouped under 
the same category (method).  
 (Quality criterion Q4) Some articles were intentionally excluded to keep the level of the SMAP manageable, in 
 5 
particular when the proposition was not relevant enough to the topic of this paper. 
 
Ninety-five searches in 24 sources were carried out using the search terms described above. In total 158 publications were 
retrieved, out of which 21 were found not directly in the 24 sources but by following relevant cited references. Figure 2 
shows the distribution of research results related to security requirements engineering and reuse between 2000 and 2013. 
The figure also shows that between 2004 and 2007 a great number of publications were published; thus, the well-known 
approaches for security requirements engineering appeared in this period. Table 4(in the Appendix) presents the retrieved 
and selected publications for each source. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Number of selected publications on (knowledge-based)  
security requirements engineering (2000–2013). 
 
D. Data classification  
 
The retrieved publications were first analyzed regarding the restrictions R1–R2. The remaining publications were 
carefully assessed regarding quality criterion Q1. For each retrieved publication the following standard information was 
collected in a data extraction form: 
 Date of search, source, and used search term. 
 Authors, title, and publication year. 
 Type of publication (conference, workshop, journal, report, or book). 
 Short summary (main claims, presented approach/tool). 
 Restrictions R1, R2 (yes or no)? 
 Quality criteria Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4 fulfilled (yes or no)? 
 Addressed research question(s). 
 Selected (yes or no)? Based on restrictions and quality criteria.  
 Comments/rationale regarding selection. 
 Need for tools. Does the publication stress the need for support (yes or no)? 
 
For each selected publication the following additional information was captured in a second form to increase 
confidence regarding their relevance for security requirements engineering elicitation and analysis: the main focus of the 
publication is on security requirements (yes) vs. security requirements are only addressed as part of a broader approach 
(no)? 
Searching the security requirements approaches and (re)usable knowledge based security requirements approaches 
conferences led to 158 papers, out of which 95 (60%) were related specifically to security requirements approaches. 
Among these 95 papers, 29 papers (31%) addressed reuse of knowledge for security requirements. Searching conferences 
led to the largest set of results: 39 papers (41%) out of 70 papers found. Note that the selected conference papers were 
mainly found in two main conferences proceedings: the international conference on Availability, Reliability and Security 
(ARES) with 13 papers found out of which 8 were selected; and the international conference on Requirements Engineering 
(RE) with 24 conference papers found and 7 selected.  
The number of selected journal papers was 20 (21%) out of 31 papers found. The total number of workshop papers found 
was 21, out of which 11 (12%) were selected. 15 out of 18 (16%) relevant technical reports were also considered in our 
search. Books and book chapters were taken in consideration too: out of 18 retrieved sources, 10 (10%) were selected.  
 
Table 4 in the appendix gives all the details about the retrieved publications, their types and the ones selected.  Figure 3 
summarizes the statistical results of all selected papers by categories (books, conferences, workshops, reports).  
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Figure 3. Relative share of the various paper types in the selected set  
(Books, Conferences, Workshops, Reports) 
 
 
For the selected papers, we were also interested in the type of the research. As recommended by Petersen et al. [20], 
we adapted the classification system developed by Wieringa et al. [110] for requirements engineering paper classification.  
The papers were thereby classified into:  
 
 Solution proposal: papers that discuss new or revised techniques,  
 Philosophical: papers that sketch a new way of looking at things, a new conceptual framework, etc. 
 Evaluation research: papers that investigate a practice or an implementation in practice and report the lessons 
learned.  
 Validation research: papers that investigate the properties of a solution proposal that has not yet been deployed 
in practice.  
 Opinion papers: papers that contain the author’s opinion about a research or practice subject.  
 Experience: papers that are often from industry practitioners or researchers who have used their tools in practice. 
They report how something was done in practice.  
Some papers covered two categories.  For example, a paper may be at the same time a “Solution proposal” and “Validation 
research”. In such cases, we labeled them “Solution proposal + Validation”. Conversely, some papers could not be linked 
to any category since they were exclusively presenting tools. Thus, we decided to use the label “Tool”.   
Table 1 summarizes the results of the classification. Most of the papers are solution proposals (41%), few of which are 
validated (22.1%). Evaluation researches that investigated the practices in industry are only (10.5%). Eight papers were 
exclusively presenting tools.    
 
Table 1. Type and number of selected papers  
 
 
 
 
S
o
lu
ti
o
n
 
P
ro
p
o
sa
l 
 
P
h
il
o
so
p
h
ic
al
 
  
E
v
al
u
at
io
n
 
 
V
al
id
at
io
n
 
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
 
O
p
in
io
n
 
 
T
o
o
l 
S
o
lu
ti
o
n
 +
 
V
al
id
at
io
n
 +
 
T
o
o
l 
 
S
o
lu
ti
o
n
+
 
V
al
id
at
io
n
 
 
Book (chapter) 5 2 1 0 0 0 2 1 0 
Journal 10 0 2 0 1 0 0 2 5 
Conference 15 2 4 0 1 0 5 0 10 
Workshop 4 2 1 2 0 0 0 2 1 
Report 5 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 5 
Total 39  
(41%)  
8  
(8.4%) 
10 
(10.5%) 
2 
(2.1%) 
2 
(2.1%) 
0 
(0%) 
8 
(8.4%) 
5 
(5.2%) 
21 
(22.1%) 
 
4.3. A framework for analyzing and comparing knowledge reuse in SRE (data extraction and 
mapping of studies) 
 
Extracting the data, while surveying in depth the different approaches for SRE with regards to knowledge reuse, allows 
us to define the different categories covered by the study and construct the map (i.e. a framework for analyzing and 
comparing knowledge reuse in SRE). The framework shown in Figure 4 is structured around facets that capture individual 
dimensions related to knowledge reuse in SRE. This framework makes it possible to organize the different methods, 
Reports
16%
Books
10%
Journals
21%Conferences
41%
Workshops
12%
Selected papers 
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techniques and tools for knowledge reuse in SRE around different axes that were identified through the SMAP and 
appeared relevant to us. 
 
1. Knowledge 
The knowledge facet identifies the different knowledge (re)used in SRE. This facet was organized under three main sub-
dimensions (by analogy to the classification framework proposed by Dubois et al. [23]):  
- Organization & Assets: all the knowledge related to the organization, its assets, its actors can be (re)used over 
different projects.  
- Risk: knowledge related to risk addresses different threats that might threaten the assets of an organization, the 
vulnerabilities that might be explored, the attackers and their attack methods.  
- Risk treatment: knowledge related to mitigating the risk, such as security requirements, countermeasures, security 
policies, etc.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Framework for knowledge reuse in SRE  
 
2. Form of representation    
The “form of representation” facet indicates the different types of knowledge forms that were identified and how they are 
organized: patterns, taxonomies and ontologies, templates and profiles, catalogs and generic models, mixed.  
 
3. Technique  
The technique facet defines if the knowledge (re)use techniques can be automated (e.g. queries), semi-automated (e.g. 
process), or are totally manual (e.g. guidelines).  
 
4. Automated support 
The “automated support” facet checks the existence of an automated support for knowledge (re)use in SRE, and its 
technology features.   
 
The next section details the publications retrieved, and replies to the research questions relying on the presented 
framework.  
 
4.4. Details of the systematic mapping study   
 
Table 2 presents an overview of the security knowledge reuse in SRE methods. Columns contain the main concepts 
characterizing the conceptual space of security. Lines cover the different reuse forms by SRE methods. Cells contain a 
colored area when there exist SRE publications proposing a reuse based approach of a given reuse form, for a given 
security concept.  The colors of the cells get darker according to the number of publications covering it. It is white when 
there is no publication describing such a link. 
This presentation should help the reader to understand the security reusable knowledge in the body of literature. It also 
helps to retrieve for each concept of security (e.g. security requirement) how (through ontologies, templates) and how 
much it is reused. As an illustration, the security concept ‘threat’ is covered by a lot of publications proposing to reuse it 
through ontologies or taxonomies.  
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Table 2. Security knowledge reuse in SRE  
 
 
Organization Asset Threat Vulnerability Security goal 
Security 
requirement 
Counter-
measure 
Ontologies/ 
taxonomies 
       
Catalog/ 
generic models 
 
 
      
Patterns 
       
Templates 
        
Mixed 
       
 
 
The following paragraphs go into the details. They present a brief description of the SRE method, followed by answers 
to the research questions (method, form of representation, technique, and automation). The paragraphs report the different 
types of reusable elements and how they are modeled and described, and how they are used. 
In fact, there are different ways for presenting and classifying SRE methods, depending on the angle from which we study 
and analyze them.  For instance, Fabian et al. [24] organize SRE methods into 6 main categories (multilateral, UML-
based, goal-oriented approaches, problem frames-based, risk analysis-based, common criteria-based). Elahi [119] 
organizes SRE methods into two main categories depending on whether the method focuses on the threats and 
vulnerabilities (the dark side of security) or on security requirements and countermeasures (the white side of security).   
As the main goal of this paper is to focus on knowledge (re) use in SRE, the different methods will be presented using 
the result of RQ2, i.e. according to the knowledge (re)use form used. Thus, we distinguish: methods that reuse patterns, 
taxonomies and ontologies, catalogs or generic models, mixed forms of reuse. We also distinguish methods that do not 
reuse any kind of security knowledge.  
 
1. Methods that (re) use security patterns  
 
A security pattern describes a particular recurring security problem that arises in specific contexts and presents a well-
proven generic scheme for its solution [115]. The SMAP found that some SRE methods (re) use patterns during the SRE 
process in the form of models or in other forms.  
 
1.1. Patterns of models   
 
The identified SRE that (re) use patterns of models are presented below:   
 
- KAOS and Anti-Models:  Lamsweerde [25][5] extended the KAOS method to support security issues at the 
requirements level. KAOS is a requirements engineering method dealing with the elaboration of the objectives to be 
achieved by the system-to-be. (Knowledge reliance) Hermoye et al. [11][26] enriched the KAOS framework with 
an attack pattern library and reusable countermeasures built after analyzing commonalities in goal-oriented 
specifications from some case studies. (Reusable Knowledge) In this approach, a reusable attack pattern captures 
common objectives of malicious agents for known attacks (e.g. replay, denial of service, password attacks). Reusable 
countermeasures are reusable anti-goal resolutions. For example, countermeasures against replay attacks may include 
freshness mechanisms. (Form of representation) Hermoye et al. use a library of attack patterns; an attack pattern is 
a fragment of an anti-model defined on an abstract domain. Attack patterns are built with abstract anti-goals and 
abstract domain properties. Abstract anti-goals, domain properties and predicates are reusable concepts defined on 
abstract domains that should be specialized in concrete domains at reuse time. (Technique) Hermoye et al. provide 
a formal technique to reuse this library for threat analysis. They propose three main functions: Retrieve to get initial 
anti-goals, and Specialize and Adapt to specialize each abstract variable (e.g., objects, agents, relations) of the attack 
pattern. (Automation) The KAOS method is supported by the Objectiver1 tool. Even though we do not have details 
about technical aspects, the tool offers some functionalities such as modeling requirements and related concepts 
(goals, obstacles, expectations, hypotheses, etc.), querying the model to retrieve some model elements, exporting in 
XML format, and data exchanges in XMI format. Note that the tool does not handle the reuse of knowledge for SRE.  
 
                                                          
1 http://www.objectiver.com/ 
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- Secure Tropos: Secure Tropos method is derived from Tropos. The latter is a software development method based 
on the paradigm of agent-oriented software development [30][31]. There are different extensions of Tropos in the 
literature. Mouratidis et al. [4][32] extend Tropos with new concepts to cover security modeling (security constraints, 
secure dependencies, secure entities) and more. Secure Tropos distinguishes four main development phases: early 
requirements, late requirements, architectural design, detailed design and architectural design. Recently, Secure 
Tropos was extended to be used in the field of cloud computing [33][34][35]. (Knowledge reliance) In a previous 
work, Tropos method was extended with security patterns [36]. (Form of representation) Authors describe a pattern 
language, based on agent-oriented concepts. They used the Alexandrian format [37] for organizing each pattern. In 
this format, the sections of a pattern are context, problem and forces, solution, and rationale.  (Reusable knowledge) 
Authors proposed four main patterns: “Agency Guard” concerned with ensuring that there is only a single point of 
access to the agency to protect it from malicious agents. “Agent Authenticator” related to authentication of agency’s 
agents. “Sandbox” related to mechanisms for separating running activities. “Access Controller” suggests intercepting 
all requests for the agency’s resources.  (Technique) Mouratidis et al. provide some guidelines and show how these 
patterns can be integrated within the architectural design stage of the Tropos agent-oriented methodology. 
(Automation) ST-Tool is one of the main tools known for Secure Tropos. Formal analysis is based on logic 
programming. ST-Tool [29] provides a graphical user interface (GUI) that allows designers editing Secure Tropos 
models as graphs where nodes are actors and services, and arcs are relationships. To the best of our knowledge, ST-
Tool does not handle the development using patterns for elicitation.    
 
 
1.2. Patterns not models  
 
The identified SRE that (re) use patterns are presented below:  
 
- Okubo et al. [57] propose a method for security impact and security requirements analyzes. There are two types of 
security impact described with more details in the paper: horizontal impact on artifacts in the same stage and vertical 
impact on artifacts in a later stage. (Knowledge reliance) The method proposed by Okubo et al. consists of two 
techniques: an analysis method of horizontal impacts using an extended misuse case; a combination of new security 
patterns and a traditional traceability technique to analyze security vertical impacts. The security patterns bridge the 
gap between security requirements and the design, so as to know impacts on code when security requirements change. 
(Form of representation) Okubo et al. constructed Security Requirements Patterns (SRPs) and Security Design 
Patterns (SDPs). A security requirement pattern is formed around a “context”, a “problem”, a “solution”, and a 
“structure”. In addition, a security design pattern has: “consequences”, “implementation” and “sample code”. 
(Reusable knowledge) In terms of knowledge, SRPs provide assets and threats. SDPs provide countermeasures. 
(Technique) The authors propose a process for security impact analysis that starts with selecting the SRP, identifying 
new assets, identifying new threats, identifying countermeasures, and finally, selecting the SDP, and ends with 
estimating the impact for each countermeasure. (Automation) The method is not tool supported.  
 
 
2. Methods that (re) use taxonomies or ontologies   
 
An ontology is a formal representation of the entities and relationships which exist in some domain. A taxonomy is an 
ontology in the form of a hierarchy. Whereas ontologies can have any type of relationship between categories, in a 
taxonomy there can only be generalization hierarchies [105]. The SMAP revealed a variety of SRE methods that suggest 
the use of ontologies or taxonomies during a SRE process:  
 
- GBRAM, the Goal-Based Requirements Analysis Method [45][46] is a straightforward methodical approach to 
identify system and enterprise goals and requirements. (Knowledge reliance & Form of representation) Anton et 
al. [47] propose a requirements taxonomy for reducing web site privacy vulnerabilities. They evaluated 25 Internet 
privacy policies from 8 non-regulated e-commerce industries. The evaluation permitted us to identify main goals and 
vulnerabilities. (Reusable knowledge) The security knowledge in the taxonomy was categorized into Privacy 
Protection Goals and Privacy Vulnerabilities.  
o Privacy protection goals express the desired protection of consumer privacy rights. They were categorized 
into five categories: notice/awareness, choice/consent, access/participation, integrity/security, and 
enforcement/redress. For instance, notice/awareness goals assert that consumers should be notified or made 
aware of an organization’s information practices before any information is actually collected from them. 
More details about the other goals can be found in Aton et al.’s publication [47].  
o Privacy vulnerabilities reflect ways in which a web site may violate consumer privacy. The seven main 
categories of privacy vulnerabilities are: information monitoring, information aggregation, information 
storage, information transfer, information collection, information personalization, and contact.  
(Technique) The authors mentioned that web site designers can use this taxonomy to ensure that their stated and 
actual policies are consistent with each other and it can be used by customers to evaluate and understand policies and 
their limitations. However, there were no precise procedures or techniques for the use. (Automation) As far as we 
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could determine, the GBRAM method is not tool supported.  
 
- Secure Tropos: Another extension of the Tropos methodology was the one proposed by Massacci et al. 
[39][2][40][41][29]. The authors use the Secure i* (Si*) language. In addition to the notions originally supported by 
the i* modeling framework, Si* introduces the notions of delegation and trust. Delegation is defined as a relation 
between two actors (the delegator and the delegatee — the one to whom something is delegated) and a goal, task, or 
resource (the delegatum). The notion of trust is used to separate delegation between trusted and untrusted actors. 
Similarly to delegation, trust is defined as a relation between two actors (the trustor and the trustee) and a goal, task, 
or resource (the trustum). A third extension to Tropos was proposed by Asnar et al. [42][43] for risk modeling, the 
Tropos Goal-Risk Framework, to assess risk, based on trust relations among actors. (Knowledge reliance) Massacci 
et al. [44] propose a formal ontology for socio-technical systems. (Form of representation) Authors formalized the 
concepts of Si* into an ontology. (Reusable knowledge) The concepts are organized into extensional and intentional 
predicates. Extensional predicates correspond to the edges and circles drawn by the requirements engineer (e.g., 
service, goal, task, resource, etc.) during the modeling phase. These predicates are used to formalize the intuitive 
description of the system. Intentional predicates are determined with the help of rules by the reasoning system; 
examples of these predicates are: aim(Actor:x,Service:s) and has_perm(Actor:x,Service:s). 
(Technique) The authors provide some axioms that define the semantics underlying Si*. They are used to complete 
the extensional description of the system. All these primitives were used to deal with the security organizational 
requirements.  
The proposition (Pro) in the example below verifies whether an actor (X) who delegates the permission (perm) to 
another actor (Y) to deliver a service (S) is entitled to do it. With other predicates, one can verify the authorization 
security requirement.  
For example, Authorization: Pro ← delegate(perm,X,Y,S) ∧ not has_perm(X,S) 
(Automation) As far as we know, there was no automation support for this Secure Tropos extension.  
 
 
- RITA: Elena Ivankina et al. [93], [94] (Knowledge reliance) present a requirements elicitation method called RITA 
(Requirements Identification Threat Analysis) that makes use of a threat ontology. (Form of representation) Security 
requirements in RITA are expressed in forms of treatment that prevent threats. Treatments are formalized as goals. A goal 
is defined as "something that some stakeholder hopes to achieve in the future" [95]. A goal is expressed as a clause with 
a main verb and several parameters, where each parameter plays a different role with respect to the verb. Example of a 
security requirement in RITA (treatment): “Provide (connection help) object (to users) destination (when the connection fails) 
time”. In this example, the parameters of the verb ‘Provide’ are: the object (connection help), the destination (to users), 
and the time (when the connection fails).   
(Reusable knowledge) The threats ontology in RITA organizes types of threats into classes and subclasses at several 
levels. Five classes are defined on the highest level: “User”, “Design”, “Environment”, “Hardware”, and “Engineering”. 
Classes and subclasses are characterized by distinctive variables that help identify threats in the ontology, and define each 
class distinctively from the others. RITA also uses a second ontology that proposes a series of generic treatments for the 
generic threats identified in the threats ontology. (Technique) RITA further relies on some additional guidelines to use 
the ontologies: it uses a matrix in which each threat in the threat ontology corresponds to the appropriate treatment from 
the treatment ontology. (Automation) RITA was implemented with a prototype whose main function was to demonstrate 
the implementability of the method.  
 
- Daramola et al. [90] [91] present an approach that leverages ontologies and requirements boilerplates in order to 
alleviate the effects of the lack of inexperienced personnel for Security Requirements Specification (SRS). 
(Knowledge reliance) Daramola et al.’s approach makes use of ontologies and requirements boilerplates. (Form of 
representation) A requirement boilerplate [92] is a pre-defined structural template for writing requirement 
statements. The fixed parts of requirement boilerplate are reused when writing requirements, while the requirement 
engineer can manually fill in the parameter parts with information from its application.  
An example of a boilerplate: 
“BP2: The <system> shall be able to <action> <entity>” 
 
The ontologies provides the necessary knowledge that is required to identify security threats, and recommend 
appropriate countermeasures, while the requirements boilerplates provide a reusable template for writing Security 
Requirements in a consistent way in order to eliminate ambiguity. (Reusable knowledge) The Basic Threat Ontology 
(BTO) used in the approach contains a mapping of some kinds of security threats to specific defense actions based on 
information that was gathered from the literature and existing security ontologies. (Technique) The knowledge 
contained in the BTO is used for automatic recommendation of appropriate defense actions. This is made through 
ontology reasoning and other semantic capabilities.  (Automation) The proposed approach is tool-supported by the 
prototype ReqSec tool. ReqSec is an eclipse-based tool that provides automated support for ontology-based security 
requirements specification by enabling the specification of security requirements from textual misuse case 
descriptions.  
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- Dritsas et al. [97] introduce (Knowledge reliance) a knowledge-based approach for the security analysis and design 
of e-health applications. (Form of representation) The authors describe different threats to security within the e-
health applications domain. They then draw a table of different security requirements (authentication, 
authorization...) with description of each in the e-health context. Finally, they specify these requirements embedded 
in a set of patterns. Each pattern contains a name, overview, problem, solution, requirements, asset, threats, 
vulnerabilities, and related patterns. Note that the authors did not present any evaluation of their proposed approach. 
(Reusable knowledge) Dritsas et al. made use of a security ontology for e-health applications. In this ontology, the 
concept of a Security Pattern is a representation of the security patterns and is connected with the concept of 
Countermeasure through a provide relationship: each security pattern provides a specific set of countermeasures. In 
practice, each security pattern is matched with a set of countermeasures during the ontology instantiation. A Security 
Pattern Context is defined as a set of Asset, Vulnerability and Deliberate Attack triplets. In this way, one can start 
from the generic security objectives, find the Security Pattern Contexts that match them and, thus, choose specific 
Security Patterns. Therefore, the high level security requirements and objectives can be fulfilled by implementing the 
respective countermeasures. (Automation) The approach is not tool supported. (Technique) The following query 
(Q) illustrates how the ontology is used by a developer involved in an e-health development project.  The query (Q) 
asks what are the countermeasures to consider in order to protect the medical data of a patient. The result returned 
by the query (from the ontology) suggests considering the countermeasures: encryption, access control, certificates, 
intrusion detection, and malicious software detection.  
Q. What countermeasures protect the medical data of a patient? 
 
nRQL Query: (retrieve (?cm) (|Medical_Data| ?cm |protected_by|))   
nRQL Result:  
 (((?CM |Encryption|))   
 ((?CM |Access_Control|))   
 ((?CM |Certificates|))   
 ((?CM |Intrusion_Detection|))   
 ((?CM |Malicious_SW_Detection|)))  
 
 
- Lasheras et al. [99] propose an ontological representation for reusable requirements, which allows incompleteness 
and inconsistency in requirements to be detected and semantic processing in requirements analysis to be achieved. 
Note that the framework seems to be at an early stage, in the sense that it does not permit security requirements 
elicitation and analysis. To date, its contribution is limited to the proposed ontologies. (Automation) The framework 
is not supported with any tool (Knowledge reliance & form of representation) Lasheras et al. defined some reusable 
knowledge encapsulated in ontologies. (Reusable knowledge) Authors defined two kinds of ontologies: a risk 
analysis ontology and a requirements ontology.  
 The risk analysis ontology is based on MAGERIT [89], the information systems risk analysis and 
management method of the Spanish public administration. The ontology identifies five types of risk 
elements: Asset, Threat, Safeguard, Valuation dimension, and Valuation criteria.  
 The concepts, meta-information and relationships included in the requirements ontology have been 
mostly taken from the authors’ experience of requirements reuse-based method SIREN [88]. The 
ontology organizes requirements into software requirements and system requirements.  
(Technique) Lasheras et al [99] rely on semantic queries on the ontology to verify the correctness of the requirement. 
 
- Salini et al. [98] introduce (Knowledge reliance) a knowledge-oriented approach addressing the security requirements 
engineering phase for developing an e-voting system. (Form of representation) For the knowledge part, the authors 
provided a security requirements ontology for e-voting systems. (Reusable knowledge) The terms used as ontology 
classes are the following: Stakeholder, Security Objective, Threat, Security Requirements, Assets, Vulnerabilities, 
Security Requirements Pattern, Impact, Severity and Web application. The relations among the ontology classes and the 
properties used to represent the relations are use, have, requires, is vulnerable to, implemented in, protects, mitigated by, 
provide, damage, affects, exploited by, addresses, assessed and part-of.  Salini et al. explained that in practice, each 
security requirements pattern is matched with a set of security requirements during the ontology instantiation. A security 
requirements pattern is defined as a set of asset, vulnerability, threats and impacts. In this way, one can start from the 
security objectives, find the security requirements pattern that matches them and, thus, choose specific security 
requirements. Although the approach seems to be interesting and useful for defining security requirements, there was no 
validation reported for it, nor for the proposed security ontology. The ontology is still under development (not all 
identified security requirements have been mapped to the security objectives). (Automation) The approach is not 
supported with any tool.  
 
- Chikh et al. [100] (Knowledge reliance) present a framework for building security requirement specifications related 
to Information Security Requirements (ISRs) using ontologies. (Form of representation) The framework uses three 
kinds of generic ontologies as a solution to this problem – software requirement ontology, application domain ontology, 
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information security ontology.  However, despite the fact that the framework looks promising, it is difficult to know its 
usefulness, since no validation was presented. (Reusable knowledge) Chikh et al.’s framework uses the security ontology 
proposed by Fenz et al. [114]. This ontology encompasses security knowledge related to threats, vulnerabilities, controls, 
organization, and its assets. (Automation) The authors mentioned ongoing development of a prototype to evaluate their 
proposition.  
 
3. Methods that (re) use templates or profiles 
 
Some SRE methods rely on templates and profiles as another kind of reusable knowledge for SRE. The identified 
methods that (re) use this forms are:  
 
- Zuccato et al.  [96] present an approach that organizes security requirements engineering around five activities. The 
first activity starts with a simplified risk analysis approach by means of questionnaires to identify areas in the business 
which can have security problems. Subsequently, the security requirements for the development project are selected 
(requirement profiles). These requirements are then forwarded to the suppliers. (Knowledge reliance & form of 
representation) The method proposed by Zuccato et al. is based essentially on the use of security requirements 
profiles that address a business domain, in a commercial organization, where activities have to serve a business 
purpose (not to be confused with security patterns which describe a security domain solution according to authors). 
(Reusable knowledge) Typical examples for this business orientation would be IP-TV Services (e.g. renting a movie, 
recording some programs, delayed viewing, ...), VoIP (e.g. multiple numbers, location locking, answering machine, 
...) or customer self-administration (e.g. myPages, myWorkingPages, MyFamily, Mobile Device Management 
(MDM)…) where a profile is created for the service category and then reused, with some adaptation, for the specific 
service. (Automation) The approach is not tool supported. 
 
- Firesmith [10] (Knowledge reliance & Form of representation) suggests using textual security requirements 
templates (not to be confused with security use cases templates). An example of a reusable parameterized template 
for specifying an integrity security requirement:  
 
“The [application center/business unit] shall protect the data it transmits from corruption (e.g., unauthorized 
addition, modification, deletion or reply) due to [unsophisticated/ somewhat sophisticated/sophisticated] attack 
during execution of [a set of interactions/use cases] as indicated in [specified table].”  
 
Users of these templates can manually replace the brackets according to their different applications. (Reusable 
knowledge) More detailed templates in Firesmith’s research could not be found. The proposition of the author is 
limited to the importance of specifying the knowledge into this kind of templates. (Technique) The author provides 
an asset-centered and reuse-based procedure for requirements and security teams to analyze security requirements 
containing 13 steps, starting by identifying the valuable assets, identifying threats, and estimating vulnerabilities. The 
steps end by specifying requirement through the instantiation of templates based on the parameters from the previous 
steps. (Automation) This proposition was not tool supported. 
 
 
4. Methods that (re) use catalogs or generic models  
 
Some SRE methods define generic models of common security problems and their solutions, in order to (re) use 
them. Some others rely on catalogs to encapsulate the reusable knowledge as presented below:   
 
- Misuse Cases: Sindre and Opdahl [48][6][49][50] extend the traditional use case approach to also consider misuse 
cases, which represent behavior not wanted in the system to be developed. Misuse cases are initiated by misusers. 
They have two representations: a graphical diagram and a textual specification. (Knowledge reliance) Misuse cases 
were initially developed without relying on any kind of knowledge repositories. However, Sindre et al. [51] then 
defined an approach based on a repository of generic misuse cases (generic threats and generic security requirements). 
(Form of representation) Sindre et al. represent the reused knowledge using generic misuse cases. Each misuse case 
has a name, summary, preconditions, misuser interactions, systems interactions, and postconditions.   
(Reusable knowledge) Authors suggest two main reusable artifacts: generic threats (e.g., spoofing, i.e., a misuser 
gaining access to the system by pretending to be a regular user) and generic security requirements (e.g., access 
control) described independently of particular application domains. (Technique) Authors provide a way to use/reuse 
this repository through some guidelines. (Automation) As far as we know, misuse cases are still not tool supported. 
 
- Abuse frames. Lin et al. [67][68][69] define so-called anti-requirements and the corresponding abuse frames. Their 
proposition is comparable to problem frames introduced by Jackson [66]. An anti-requirement specifies the 
undesirable phenomena in the system that must be prevented from happening; it expresses the intentions of malicious 
users. An abuse frame represents a security threat. Authors incorporate anti-requirements into abuse frames to 
represent a security threat. The authors state that the purpose of anti-requirements and abuse frames is to analyze 
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security threats and derive security requirements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Reusable knowledge) In problem frames, each frame describes a particular problem class (e.g., Information Display, 
Workpiece, and Required Behavior frames). Similarly, Lin et al. propose abuse frames that describe classes of security 
violation (interception, modification, and denial of access). Each one represents a threat that can violate a particular 
security goal. (Knowledge reliance & Form of representation) These security violations, represented through abuse 
frames diagrams, are meant to be reusable. As an example, Figure 5 shows a standard modification frame. Modification 
arises whenever an attacker wishes to change an information asset in the physical world. The problem is to find a 
modification machine that allows an attacker to achieve it. Modification violates integrity. (Technique) The authors 
propose an iterative threat analysis method that essentially comprises four steps (scoping the problem and identify the 
sub-problems, identifying the threats and constructing abuse frames, identifying security vulnerabilities, addressing 
security vulnerabilities).  (Automation) As far as we know, abuse frames are not supported with a tool.   
 
 
- Security Use Cases: Donald Firesmith presented security use cases [7]. (Knowledge reliance) Firesmith tried to keep 
the security use cases templates [7] at a reasonably high-level of abstraction for reusability purposes. (Form of 
representation) Security use cases have a name, a path, a security threat, preconditions, misuser interactions, system 
requirements, and postconditions. (Reusable knowledge) The author presented the reusable use cases: access 
control, integrity, and privacy (Technique) The author emphasizes that, when reused on real projects, each path 
template can be made more specific to the application by replacing the general words “system” and “user” with the 
specific application name and the specific type of user. (Automation) To our knowledge, security use cases are not 
tool supported.  
 
- Saeki and Kaiya [71] propose a weaved security requirements elicitation method that uses (Knowledge reliance) 
Common Criteria (CC) [70] and related knowledge sources to identify security requirements from functional 
requirements through eliciting threats and security objectives. (Reusable knowledge) The authors think that CC can 
be considered as a kind of catalog to provide knowledge on threats, security objectives, and security functions that 
have generally appeared. For example, by using Common Criteria, one can select the objective “data encryption” 
from the catalog, to mitigate the threat “disclosure of password data”. (Technique) The proposed technique is to 
weave through CC two types of requirements elicitation: one is any existing functional requirements elicitation, and 
the other is a typical method for eliciting security functional requirements. (Form of representation) The method 
relies on CC as a source of knowledge to support activities of security requirements elicitation. The authors used CC 
Part 2 [72], which has about 120 Security Functional (SF) components, as a catalog. In addition, they used ECMA- 
271 E-COFC [73] (which can be considered as a profile of CC in a certain problem domain), as catalogs of threats 
and security objectives. As shown in the right hand side of Figure 6, the method accumulates a threat catalog, a 
security objective catalog, and a SF component catalog, and holds relationships between their catalog entries (i.e. 
security objective mitigates threat, SF component represents security objective). (Automation) As far as we know, 
the proposition of Saeki and Kaiya is not tool supported. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. A standard modification abuse frame taken from [67] 
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- SIREN for security requirements. Toval et al. [88] propose an approach for security requirements elicitation. 
(Knowledge reliance) The approach is a particularization of SIREN (SImple REuse of software requiremeNts), a 
general-purpose RE method based on requirements reuse. The particularization of SIREN to the security profile has 
been based on the risk analysis and management method MAGERIT [89]. Security requirements specify the 
countermeasures prescribed by MAGERIT after the risk analysis. Therefore, it is the MAGERIT risk analysis and 
management that determines the security mechanism to be used in each circumstance. SIREN encompasses a process 
model and some guidelines. (Form of representation) The guidelines that SIREN provides consist of a hierarchy of 
requirements specification documents together with the templates for each document. These serve to structure a 
reusable requirements repository. (Reusable knowledge) The repository defined in SIREN contains functional and 
non-functional requirements from specific domains and profiles. A SIREN profile consists of a homogeneous set of 
requirements that can be applied to a variety of domains, such as information systems security, and the personal data 
privacy law. There are two main types of requirements in the repository:  
o Parameterized: this kind of requirements contains some parts that have to be adapted to the application 
being developed at the time. If this requirement is chosen, the parameterized part will be instantiated, 
that is, the information in brackets will be replaced by a specific value according to the current project. 
For example: “SRS.3.5.3.1.S.301 The security manager shall check the user’s identifiers every [time in 
months] to detect which ones have not been used in the last [time in months].” 
o Non-parameterized: requirements that could be applied directly to any project concerning the profiles 
and/or domains in the repository. For example: “SRS.3.4.3.S.5. The firewall configuration will be 
screened host.” 
(Technique) Toval et al. adapted a spiral life cycle in SIREN to take requirements reuse explicitly into account 
in the RE process. Details about the process can be found in [88]. (Automation) To our knowledge, SIREN is 
not tool supported. 
 
- Secure Tropos: (Knowledge reliance) In their recent work [34][33], Mouratidis et al. suggest considering the activity 
of cataloging during the elicitation and analysis process. The main aim of this activity is to develop a reference 
catalog model that can be employed not just for the project for which it was initially developed but can work as a 
reference model for any projects that demonstrate similar characteristics. (Form of representation) The reference 
catalog diagram takes the form of a reference model that contains graphical representation of different concepts 
needed for elicitation process. (Reusable knowledge) The reference catalog provides relationships between the 
concepts security and privacy goals, threats, security and privacy measures, and security and privacy mechanisms. 
For example, the security goal “availability” can be threatened by the threats “Data Location” and “Insecure Storage”. 
The measure to mitigate these threats can be “API Interoperability” which uses the mechanisms “Middleware, 
Support Multiple Providers”.  For their case study, authors used existing information in the security document of the 
company to construct a cataloguing diagram. (Automation)  The framework is supported by a tool, which has been 
developed based on the Open Models Initiative ADOxx Platform2. The tool provides an environment for developers 
to create a number of diagrams that support the process of the method. In particular, the tool permits development of 
the Security and Privacy Reference Catalog Diagram discussed before.  
 
 
5. Methods that (re) use mixed forms of security knowledge 
 
There are a variety of SRE methods that (re) use different (mixed) forms of knowledge; our SMA identified the 
following ones:  
                                                          
2 www.openmodels.at 
Figure 6. Using knowledge included in Common Criteria, taken from  [34]  
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- SQUARE [78][79][80] is a multilateral approach. Multilateral security [77] aims at a balance between the competing 
security requirements of different parties. SQUARE aims to integrate security requirements engineering into software 
development processes [79]. (Knowledge reliance) Travis et al. introduced a new variant of SQUARE; R-SQUARE 
[81] which is defined using SQUARE Lite as a base model and incorporating reuse in some places of the process. 
(Reusable knowledge) However the introduced layer of reusable knowledge gives only some indications and no 
more. Throughout the selected publications, it was not possible to access to this reusable knowledge. For example, 
during the “agree on definitions” step, the authors suggest creating and maintaining a glossary of relevant terms and 
definitions so that the meanings of requirements do not become ambiguous over time as they are reused. During the 
identification of assets and goals step, the authors recall that organizations that develop product lines of secure 
software [82] will likely have overarching business and security-related goals that are intended to apply to all affected 
projects. During the risk assessment phase, R-SQUARE method suggests to use threat models, which are known to 
be abstract and highly reusable.  (Form of representation) As understood from papers related to R-SQUARE, the 
method uses mixed forms of representation of the reusable knowledge such as definitions, models, and product lines. 
However, the authors did not provide any example to better understand what these forms look like. (Technique) It 
is not clear what the techniques used to access the reusable knowledge are. (Automation) SQUARE has been 
automated by means of the P-SQUARE tool; this tool is designed for use by stakeholders, requirements engineers, 
and administrators. It supports both the security and privacy aspects of SQUARE by recording definitions and 
searching and adding new terms, identifying the project business goals, assets, and security or privacy goals, adding 
or editing links to project artifacts performing risk assessment and identify threats. No technical details were provided 
concerning the tool. Moreover, the tool P-SQUARE does not support R-SQUARE (Reusable SQUARE). 
 
- SREP. Mellado et al. [74] [75] present the Security Requirements Engineering Process (SREP). SREP is an iterative 
and incremental security requirements engineering process, which is based on the Unified Process [76] software life-
cycle model with multiple phases. (Knowledge reliance) SREP is asset based, risk driven, and, following the 
Common Criteria (CC) [75], it supports the reuse of security requirements, as well as the reuse of knowledge on 
assets, threats, and countermeasures. (Form of representation) It relies on a Security Resources Repository (SRR), 
which stores some reusable security elements that are of different forms: plain text, security use cases, attack trees, 
misuse cases. (Reusable knowledge) The meta-model showing the organization of the SRR is exposed in Figure 7.  
The most important aspects of it are:  
 Generic Threat and Generic Security Requirements are described independently of particular domains. 
 Security Requirement Cluster is a set of requirements that work together in satisfying the same security 
objective and mitigating the same threat. 
 The Req-Req relationship allows an inclusive or exclusive trace between requirements. An exclusive trace 
between requirements means that they are mutually alternative, as for example that they are in conflict or 
overlapping. Whereas an inclusive trace between requirements means that to satisfy one, another (others) is 
(are) needed to be satisfied.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Automation) Tool support is critical for the practical application of the SREP in large-scale software systems due to the 
number of handled artifacts and the several iterations that have to be carried out. However the authors have not developed 
it so far.  
 
6. Methods that do not (re) use security knowledge  
 
Figure 7.  Meta-model for security resources repository taken from [28] 
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The SMAP found that there are a wide variety of SRE methods that do not consider knowledge reuse during the SRE 
process; we summarize them below. Note that for this category, we obviously skip answering the questions related to 
reusable knowledge, form of representation, and technique. Since there is no knowledge reliance, we cannot talk about 
the points related to the knowledge reused, its form of presentation, or the technique for reusing it.  
   
- Secure I*: Liu et al. [3][27][28] propose employing explicit modeling of relationships among strategic actors in order 
to elicit and analyze security requirements. Authors analyze attackers, vulnerabilities in an actor’s dependency 
network, countermeasures, and access controls. In Liu et al.’s contribution, actors are assumed to be potential 
attackers that inherit capabilities, intentions, and social relationships of the corresponding legitimate actor. 
(Knowledge reliance) Authors mentioned that it would be useful to retrieve attacks and prototypical solutions from 
pre-defined taxonomies or knowledge repositories [3], but the method, as it is, does not handle the use of this kind 
of knowledge so far. (Automation) Secure I* was not initially tool-supported [3]. Later, Giorgini et al. adapted 
Secure I* concepts within Secure Tropos and proposed ST-tool [29] which is used today for secure I* diagrams. As 
far as we know, the tool does not support reuse of knowledge for SRE.  
 
- UMLSec and SecureUML: Are two main UML-based extensions for modeling security. SecureUML[8][52] is a 
UML-based modeling language for the model-driven development of secure systems [8]. SecureUML takes 
advantage of Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) for specifying authorization constraints by defining a vocabulary 
for annotating UML-based models with information relevant to access control. Using UMLsec [9][53][54][55], 
security requirements are defined by assigning security stereotypes, constraints, and tagged values, which are defined 
in a UML profile for the elements of the design models.  (Knowledge reliance) Neither UMLSec nor SecureUML 
considers the (re) use of security requirements knowledge.  
(Automation – SecureUML) Araujo et al. [52] present a SecureUML template — a Microsoft Visio template built 
to model authorization systems. The tool allows architects to model their role-based access control systems. We could 
not find technical information about the SecureUML template. According to Araujo et al., the proposed template 
helps developers by identifying poor authorization design and implementations, helping to find contradictions/holes 
such as backdoors, or identifying authorization bypass opportunities.  
(Automation - UMLSec) Jürjens et al. [54] present a framework for verification of UMLsec models for security 
requirements. The framework provides three input and output interfaces for the analysis plug-ins: a textual command-
line interface, a graphical user interface, and a web-interface. Inputs can be UML diagrams in the form of XMI files, 
as well as textual parameters. As output can be UML diagrams as XMI (or .zuml) files and text messages. Advanced 
users of the UMLsec approach can use the tool to implement verification routines for the constraints associated to 
self-defined stereotypes. A new UMLSec implementation variant called CARiSMA [56] has existed since 2012, and 
this time is based on the Eclipse Modeling Framework. CARiSMA enables users to perform compliance analyses, 
risk analyses, and security analyses.  
(Reusable knowledge) Neither the automation for UMLSec or for SecureUML supports the reuse of knowledge.   
 
- CORAS: Dahl et al.  [58][59][60][61] present an organizational model-based method that covers threat, vulnerability, 
and security risk analysis. It also covers the elicitation of security goals. The language consists of five different kinds 
of diagrams: asset diagrams, threat diagrams, risk diagrams, treatment diagrams, and treatment overview diagrams. 
Their basic building blocks are presented in Figure 8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Knowledge reliance) We could not find any papers that present the CORAS method (re) using security knowledge. 
(Automation) The CORAS Tool [60] follows a client-server model and is developed entirely in Java. The CORAS 
client application permits the analyst to create new analysis projects and documents, to edit security analysis results, 
to generate analysis reports. The latest version [59] has in addition a user interface containing a pull down menu, a 
tool bar, and a palette that contains all model elements. The CORAS tool does not support the reuse of knowledge.  
 
- ISSRM: Mayer et al. [1] propose a risk-based security requirements engineering framework that focuses on integrating 
risk analysis with requirements engineering activities. The main idea is to align Information Technology (IT) security 
with business goals. For this aim, the impacts of risks on business assets are analyzed; threats and vulnerabilities in 
the architecture are identified, and security requirements are defined in order to mitigate the risks. (Knowledge 
reliance) ISSRM approach does not rely on any kind of knowledge repositories. (Automation) ISSRM approach is 
Figure 8.  Basic building blocks of the CORAS diagrams taken from [61] 
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not tool supported. 
 
- MORDA: Evans et al. [62][63] propose Mission Oriented Risk and Design Analysis (MORDA) as a methodology 
for analyzing security risks. Morda combines threats, attacks, and mission impact concepts for deriving an unbiased 
risk metric. (Knowledge reliance) Through this literature review, no publication addressing security knowledge (re) 
use by MORDA was found. (Automation) MORDA is not supported by any tool. 
 
- CRAC++: Morali and Wieringa present a method named CRAC++ [64], which is an extension of the older method 
CRAC [65]. The Confidentiality Risk Assessment and Comparison (CRAC) is an architecture-based method for 
confidentiality risk assessment in IT outsourcing. In CRAC++, the method is extended with a step to identify 
confidentiality requirements in outsourcing. In other words, the method specifies and identifies confidentiality 
requirements of the client that are not implied by the known confidentiality requirements of the provider, and which 
therefore are candidates for inclusion in a Service Level Agreement (SLA) with that provider. Authors present a case 
study to evaluate the method. (Knowledge reliance) To the best of our knowledge, CRAC++ neither relies on nor 
uses predefined reusable structured knowledge. (Automation) CRAC++ is not equipped with a tool. 
 
 
- SREF: Haley et al. [83][84] present a framework for security requirements elicitation and analysis called SREF 
(Security Requirements Engineering Framework). (Knowledge reliance) To the best of our knowledge, Haley et al. 
do not rely on knowledge reuse for their proposed SREF. (Automation) No tool is presented with this framework. 
 
- MSRA, for Multilateral Security Requirements Analysis [86][87], aims to apply the principles of multilateral security 
[77] during the requirements engineering phase of systems development. This is done by analyzing security and 
privacy goals of all the stakeholders regarding the system-to-be, identifying conflicts, and consolidating the different 
stakeholders’ views. (Knowledge reliance) The method does not rely on reusable knowledge for security 
requirements elicitation. (Automation) No tool is presented with the method, to the best of our knowledge. 
 
 
5. Summary  
 
The systematic mapping study recalls a great interest in security requirements engineering with a considerable attention 
to the (re)use of knowledge for defining security requirements. This section returns to the main research questions of this 
paper and replies to them according to all the publications retrieved.  
 
The following summarizes the answers to the research questions. 
 
RQ1. Does the security requirements method rely on reusable knowledge?  
 
Our results indicate that reuse knowledge is addressed in 29 (31%) out of 95 papers. This allows us to conclude that 
overall, the deployment of reusable knowledge in security methods is relatively unexploited and possibly immature. The 
rate of evaluation papers found (only 10.5%) indicates that most of the propositions are not evaluated regarding their 
applicability and usability in large-scale case studies. Moreover, most experiments do not involve end users from practice. 
One might say that this is due to the fact that most of these methods were proposed in an academic context, mostly through 
PhD dissertations focusing on validating the proposition in a small-scale laboratory experiment rather than in large-scale 
case studies.    Nevertheless, this indicates that more attention should be given to the applicability and usability of the 
deployment of knowledge (re) use in SRE.  
 
RQ2. How is the reused knowledge represented?  
 
Surveying the different proposals allowed us to identify different forms of knowledge representation: Patterns constituted 
(9.4%) of them, taxonomies and ontologies (13.6%), templates and profiles (2.1%), catalogs and generic models (10.5%). 
Few propositions (3.1%) used a mix of these different forms. The rest of the proportion concerns proposals that don’t 
reuse security knowledge. This gives us a picture about the different forms to represent and access knowledge proposed 
in the literature. The question remains of why some representations are more “popular” than others, and it would be 
interesting to find out more directly from academics and practitioners (through a survey) about why they may prefer some 
forms to others. For instance, one might suggest the hypothesis that ontologies are known to feature reasoning 
mechanisms, catalogs might be easy to access and generic models might be easy to visualize for re-use.  
 
In any case, the following summarizes the different forms of knowledge representation identified:     
 
- Security patterns:   
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 Models:  Notably the work of Hermoy et al. [11] who propose an attack pattern library containing attack trees 
using the KAOS framework, and the proposition of Mouratidis et al. [36] who enforce the Secure Tropos method 
with security patterns models.     
  Not models: The method proposed by Okubo et al. [57] makes use of security requirements patterns and security 
design patterns.  
- Generic models:  Some researches propose repositories of generic models for the purpose of reuse, such as generic 
misuse cases [51], security use cases [7] and abuse frames diagrams [69].  
- Security requirements templates (plain text): Firesmith suggests reusable security requirements templates [10]. 
SIREN relies on a repository of parameterized and non-parameterized security requirements [88]. 
- Ontologies:  Some approaches propose the use of ontologies for SRE [90][94][97][98][99][100]; most of them are in 
their early stages and not yet validated. In fact, existing categories of security requirements do not use these ontologies.   
- Taxonomies: As a continuity of the proposed method GBRAM, Anton and Erap [47] propose a taxonomy for reducing 
web sites privacy vulnerabilities. 
- Catalogs: The recent work of Mouratidis et al. [34] suggested relying on a catalog of reusable models, but did not 
mention what these models contain exactly and how to use them. Saeki and Kaiya’s [71] method makes use of Common 
Criteria catalogs that contain threats, security objectives, and SF components.   
- Profiles: Zuccato et al.’s method uses what the authors call security requirements profiles [96].  
- Mixed:  The method SREP [74] relies on a Security Resource Repository (SRR) which stores reusable security elements 
that can be represented in different forms (misuse cases, attack trees, security use cases, UMLSec, plain text). The method 
R-Square [81] also uses different kinds of reuse structures such as definitions, glossaries, and threat models.   
RQ3. What are the techniques for (re) using the knowledge?  
Most of the approaches (14.7%) provide manual guidelines for reuse; some of them add a process to follow. Few rely on 
semi-automated techniques (10.5%) such as formal rules. The ontology-based approaches take advantages of reasoning 
features of ontologies. These results indicate a high tendency to re-use through manual guidelines and a low trend to 
automatic techniques (only 5%), which can be seen as a weakness. By that, we mean that starting with a well-formalized 
knowledge source then re-using it through a human activity following some guidelines may lead to negative results if the 
process is not applied well.   
RQ4. What are the main reused elements? 
The main reused elements are often threats (26.3%) and security requirements (30.5%) (cf. Table 2). The reused 
knowledge might differ slightly from one approach to another, but there is always knowledge related to the dark side of 
security (threats) and the treatment side (security requirements).  Reusing threats and security requirements (two important 
parts of a SRE process) is important and most proposed methods seem to be attentive to that as the results indicate. In 
fact, most methods propose the threats and the different security requirements that correspond to them (or mitigate them). 
However, let us recall that the scope of ‘security’ is much larger than that. For instance, very few approaches reused 
knowledge related to the organization and its assets (5.2%). So what about the organizational side where threats appear 
and arise? (The assets to protect and their locations, the different persons involved in an organization, the organizational 
activities…) This knowledge can be reused too through different projects.  In addition to threats, there are the attackers, 
or categories of attackers, their attack methods and their attack tools, classes of vulnerabilities and common impacts of 
threats. Research on re-use of knowledge in SRE should consider more elements of security and not just requirements 
and threats.  
Figure 9 presents a conceptual graph containing two main levels. The first one (l1) represents the conceptual space of 
security. It contains the main concepts used in security and the relations between them; an organization has assets that 
threatened by threats. The latter exploit vulnerabilities and are mitigated by security requirements fulfilled by 
countermeasures. Security requirements satisfy security goals. This conceptual representation was adapted from the core 
security ontology presented in [116]. The second level (l2) represents the different knowledge forms and methods. The 
concepts of the two levels (l1 and l2) are related by the relation Reused-By. This presentation should help the reader to 
retrieve for each concept of security (e.g. security requirement) how it is reused (though ontologies, templates) and by 
which methods (Okubo et al., Firesmith).  
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Figure 9. Conceptual graph summarizing the knowledge reuse by SRE methods. 
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RQ5. Are they tool supported?  
Among the 95 selected papers, only 13.6% propose tool support. However, most approaches do not provide tools that 
handle the reuse of knowledge, except one approach [91], where the authors present only a prototype. The tool mentioned 
by Mouratidis et al. [34] provides a way to create the reference catalog diagram and reuse it as discussed before.  
This indicates that most propositions are unfortunately not tool supported. A possible explanation can be, as stated for 
RQ1, namely that in the academic environment where these methods were proposed, tool implementation is not the main 
focus.  
RQ6. What are the new challenges regarding security knowledge (re) use in SRE?  
 
Based on the SMAP presented in this paper, the challenges in the following are part of the authors’ own view of open 
questions:   
(Challenge 1) It is interesting to note that the risk-based approaches found do not handle reuse of security knowledge. 
The challenge will be to reconsider knowledge reuse in these methods. (Challenge 2) Many approaches for SRE relying 
on ontologies are emerging. They seem to be at their early stages and have not been validated yet. The challenge is to 
strengthen them and to apply them to large-scale case studies. (Challenge 3) Ontology-based approaches are not handled 
by the existing security requirements engineering categories (model based), it would be interesting to see how to merge 
these two directions. (Challenge 4) There is a lack in automated support that handles knowledge reuse for the different 
SRE methods.  More tools to support that would be appreciated. (Challenge 5) It would be interesting to generalize and 
unify all these efforts (like in UML), so that they can more easily be exploited by companies. 
Table 3 (in page 23) summarizes the results of the systematic literature review. The columns contain the different SRE 
methods grouped into categories. The lines contain the main aspects of knowledge reuse (form of representation, reusable 
knowledge elements, reuse technique, and automation). The code used to fill the cells of the matrix is also presented. 
Cells marked with “-” mean that the method does not take in consideration the corresponding aspect of knowledge reuse.  
 
6. Related works  
To the best of our knowledge, no research exists in the literature to review in a systematic way the issue of knowledge 
reuse in security requirements engineering. One worth mentioning work though is that of Chernak [101] who conducted 
an online survey on requirements reuse in 2010 . His survey reports that 80% of participants find that reuse is important 
and brings benefits. Yoshioka et al. [102] presented a survey limited to security patterns. This is interesting, but the other 
forms of reuse are neglected, whereas they were taken in consideration in this paper. In a previous work [105], we 
presented a survey on the use of ontologies in SRE. This work was the start of our research project; it has been extended 
to other forms of knowledge reuse in SRE in the current paper.   
Devanbu et al. [107] is one of the old references that presented a “brief” survey on security models and requirements. 
Recently, some publications were dedicated to security requirements engineering [24][103][104][106]. Iankoulova et al. 
[108] propose a systematic review about security requirements in the cloud computing.  
However, none of these existing reviews tackled the specific issue of “knowledge reuse”. In addition to the presented 
framework and the SMAP, this paper updates the existing surveys by the latest methods that appeared very recently in 
the literature.  
 
7. Threats to validity 
Like with empirical researches, there are threats to the validity. In the following some threats that might compromise our 
results are cited:  
Search engines used in the SMAP (External validity) 
All retrieved results rely on the functionality and precision of the search engines of the used digital libraries. 
Unfortunately, many search engines of computer science digital libraries turned out to be unreliable. Moreover, the results 
were based on digital libraries for which our institution has subscription to. Unfortunately we were not able to explore a 
system like SCOPUS, which is known to be particularly useful because it indexes publications from a large number of 
publishers.  
Selected sources (Construction validity) 
In this research, the SMAP was more focused on publications’ sources related to the security requirements engineering 
field than on those related to the knowledge engineering field.  This makes the results subject to discussion and comparison 
with other SMAPs’ results that might address the subject in the other way around, “security requirements in knowledge 
engineering” for example. Moreover, being researchers in the area of requirements engineering and information systems, 
there is a risk that we may have been biased by our experience and collaborations in the selection and the analysis despite 
our effort to avoid it. For example, some selected studies of the mapping involved previously the authors or their 
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colleagues. In particular, the papers presenting the method RITA [93][94] (that included previous researches of one of 
the authors) were intentionally added to the selected papers. The paper presenting security ontologies [105] cited in the 
related works section was part of previous researches in the same research project by three of the authors.  
The primary search (screening) that was based mainly on title, keywords and a succinct read of the abstract might have 
missed relevant papers related to the topic. Some reuse forms like ‘templates’ or ‘taxonomies’ that were discovered 
through the study were not initially considered in the list of keywords. Moreover, the decision to read or not to read much 
more than the abstract (for the purpose of selection) strongly depends on the subjective feeling of the authors.  
There is another threat related to the number of years that we mention here:  the main searches were based on a defined 
interval of years. The goal of covering a big interval (2000-2013) turned to be ambitious and difficult to manage. There 
was a need to restrict the number of papers beyond the selected criteria just to make the process manageable and better 
reported; this might also induce some bias on the final results.  
While executing the research protocol, selecting sources is not an easy and straightforward task. In particular, the choice 
of quality/selection criteria. For example Quality criterion Q1 (publications containing several unsupported claims or 
frequently referring to existing work without providing a citation were excluded) may lead to controversial opinions. It 
depends on subjective judgments by the reviewer, which can only be reduced through feedback from peers. The 
categorization choices (the map) are another point of discussion. Within the application of the same research protocol, 
other researchers may decide on a different categorization of the findings.   
Results (Conclusion validity) 
The results of the SMAP are useful and interesting; however these conclusions are based on sources retrieved in 
conferences, journals, academic and some industrial reports. It would have been interesting to compare these results with 
others based on online surveys where real world practitioners are asked about their practices and opinions on security 
requirements reuse. In addition to that, although there was a careful analysis of the available literature resulting in the 
presented framework, researches may find that some criteria may have been neglected. Another threat to validity is related 
toe searching exclusively in English writing sources, although it is the largely used language by researchers, but one 
should pay attention that there are many active communities in other countries who may propose interesting researches 
related to the topic.      
 
8. Conclusion  
 
Over 30 methods to support SRE engineering were reviewed in this paper. One can safely say that we are now far away 
from the first generation of “checklist” based methods as presented by Baskerville [113] in the early nineties.  A significant 
number of publications in the requirements engineering community illustrate the steady interest in security requirements 
engineering during the last two decades. The area of security knowledge reuse is still emerging.  One single mapping 
study can never be able to cover all aspects of existing contributions. Each one can tackle a single aspect. The richness of 
the literature allows us to deduce that SRE engineering thus embraces a consequent body of knowledge. The temporal 
range of the papers considered in our SMAP moreover confirms that this knowledge becomes sufficiently generic to be 
reused in a systematic way. 
This paper presented the details and results of a systematic mapping study conducted to get an extensive overview of 
existing research on knowledge reuse within SRE.  The review provides an overview of important existing approaches 
and tools. It also proposes a replicable and extensible framework for comparing SRE methodologies. More than 30 
approaches covering 13 years of SRE practice were analyzed.  Our iterative refinement resulted in a final set of five main 
types of knowledge forms of representation that were (re) used by SRE approaches: (1) security patterns; (2) taxonomies 
and ontologies; (3) templates and profiles; (4) catalogs and generic models; (5) mixed. For each form of representation, 
more details were provided about the related SRE approach to it, its (re) use, and the tool support provided. A framework 
to compare and analyze knowledge reuse in SRE was also defined.  
The main goal of our SMAP was to provide a good reference to researchers and PhD students to get a clear map on 
knowledge reuse across SRE and find answers to the different questions on this topic. This is distinguishable comparing 
to other reviews that compared some existing SRE methods but did not target the knowledge reuse related questions.    
This SMAP can be useful to practitioners (requirements engineers, security officers, security engineers, etc.) who are 
interested to know what is going in research in terms of SRE. The SMAP provides to practitioners various SRE methods 
altogether with different knowledge reuse forms (ontologies, patterns, profiles, models, catalogs…).  The results of the 
SMAP can be particularly useful to security architects because they reuse knowledge at corporate level and their 
responsibilities include to leverage knowledge reuse.  For any given set of requirements, an architect can and should 
typically identify and evaluate multiple different architectures and architectural mechanisms before selecting what he or 
she thinks will be the optimum way of fulfilling the requirements. Thus, there are often many ways for an architecture or 
security team to address a specific kind of security requirement. Knowing the different methods can make their job easier. 
These results will also be useful to beginners in requirement engineering as an aid for training in identifying, analyzing, 
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specifying, and managing security requirements. Requirements teams often do not include subject matter experts in 
security [10]. Such a body of knowledge can be made available to this intended audience, even if this requires further 
research and development to make it available in a convenient way. 
Our SMAP may help researchers to evaluate both the state of the art in SRE and the open issues due to the limitations in 
SRE knowledge representation. A further research avenue, for example, could be to explore new knowledge 
representation models and evaluate how they could enrich the SRE knowledge elicitation process and, consequently, this 
knowledge reuse. Research on ontologies mention that current ontology languages are limited and that there is a need for 
semantically richer knowledge models. 
The SMAP raises new questions that both research and industrial communities may face:  
At the industrial level, the question arises about the real practices of industrials on knowledge reuse during security 
requirements elicitations and analyses. What are the good and the bad practices that experts and security consultants may 
suggest? A survey should be a next step to find answers to these questions.  
Moreover, given all these propositions that appeared during the last two decades, what is their maturity (scalability, 
efficiency) for use in real life industrial environments? Validation studies are still not sufficient. Such validation process 
requires a cross disciplinary work. Moreover, the lack of automated support and the fact that many of the SRE methods 
rely on reusable knowledge that is not standard remain as issues. The deficiency in automation support may suggest that 
companies (IT vendors and software producers) still have not invested enough in this domain. This leads to the question 
about how the automation can be made part of existing security technologies that exist already in companies?  
On a research level, many issues may be elicited. Why most of risk-based approaches do not incorporate knowledge 
reuse? Why is there a lack in automated support that handles knowledge reuse for the different SRE methods?  One may 
claim that conceptual methods are often created as part of PhD researches where automation is not required as part of the 
dissertation process. However, the research community should be aware of this and should re-focus from method creation 
to automation and then to evaluations to reach a better assessment of the research contributions.    
And, even further in the future, can we imagine a collaborative work between researchers and practitioners for a 
generalization and unification of all these efforts (like in UML), so that their exploitation in practice and even in academic 
teaching institutions becomes easier? 
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Table 3. Summary of the systematic mapping study                                                                                                           
Form of representation: P=Pattern, Tax=Taxonomy, O=Ontology, C=Catalog, GM=Generic Model, T=Template, Pr= Profile, M=Mixed, - =Null 
                                               Reusable knowledge: T=Threats, C=Countermeasures, A=Asset, O= Organization, G=Goal, V=Vulnerabilities, SR=Security Requirements, - =Null 
                                               Technique: FR=Formal Rules, G=Guidelines, P = Process, Q= Queries, - =Null 
Automation: N=No, Y=Yes, - =Null 
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Appendix. Systematic Mapping study: Retrieved publications. 
Table 4 (in the following) presents the searches conducted and the list of all publications retrieved in our systematic 
mapping study. For each retrieved paper, the following information is provided: name of the first author, title of the paper, 
year of publication and digital library/resource. For each category, and for each conference/workshop, the table gives the 
number of papers found followed by the number of selected papers (using our selection criteria). Finally, the black color 
refers to papers selected; the green color refers to papers not selected in the SMAP. 
Table 4. Table of all retrieved papers.   
 
First Author 
 
Title 
Pub. 
Year 
 
Digital library/resource 
Books & Book Chapters, Phd. Found=18, Selected=10     
Mayer N. Model-based Management of Information System Security Risk 2012 Amazon 
Lund, M. S. The CORAS Tool 2011 SpringerLink 
Hull, E. Requirements Engineering. 2011 GoogleBooks 
Yu, E. Modelling strategic relationships for process reengineering.  2011 GoogleBooks 
Lopez, J. Analysis of Security Threats, Requirements, Technologies and Standards in Wireless Sensor 
Networks 
2009 Foundations of Security 
Analysis and Design 
Massacci, F. An ontology for secure socio-technical systems. 2007 Handbook of Ontologies for 
Business Interaction. 
Lamsweerde, 
A.  
Engineering Requirements for System Reliability and Security. 2007 IOS press ebooks 
Giorgini, P. Security and Trust Requirements Engineering 2005 Foundations of Security 
Analysis and Design 
Jürjens, J. Secure systems development with UML.  2005 Amazon 
Ivankina, E. An Approach to Guide Requirement Elicitation by Analysing the Causes and Consequences of 
Threats 
2005 Information Modelling and 
Knowledge Bases 
Kruchten, P. The Rational Unified Process: An Introduction 2004 Amazon 
Jackson, M. J Problem Frames: Analysing & Structuring Software Development Problems 2001 Amazon 
Yu, E. Modelling Trust for System Design Using the i * Strategic Actors Framework 2001 SpringerLink 
Antón, A Strategies for Developing Policies and Requirements for Secure Electronic Commerce Systems. 2000 SpringerLink 
Jacobson, I. The unified software development process. 1999 Amazon 
Kotonya, G. Requirements engineering: processes and techniques.  1998 Amazon 
Jackson, M. J. Software requirements & specifications: a lexicon of practice, principles, and prejudices 1995 Amazon 
Abiteboul,S. Foundations of databases 1995 Amazon 
Journals, Found=31, Selected=20 
Computer, Found=1, Selected=1 
Nuseibeh,B.  Securing the skies: in requirements we trust  2009 IEEE Computer society  
Journal of Electronic Security and Digital Forensics, Found=1, Selected=0 
Ivan,F. Integrating security and usability into the requirements and design process 2007 ACM 
Journal of Software Engineering and Knowledge Engineering, Found=3, Selected=2  
Mouratidis, H. Modelling Secure Systems Using an Agent-Oriented Approach and Security Patterns. 2006 Google scholar 
Mouratidis, H. Secure Tropos: A Security-Oriented Extension of the Tropos Methodology  2006 Google scholar 
Bauer, B Agent UML: A formalism for specifying multiagent software systems.  2000 Citeseerx 
Electronic Journal for E-Commerce Tools and Applications. Found=1, Selected=1  
Dritsas, S.  A knowledge-based approach to security requirements for e-health applications 2006 www.ejeta.org 
Autonomous Agents and Multi- Agent Systems, Found=1, Selected=1 
Bresciani, P.  Tropos: An agent-oriented software development methodology 2004 SpringerLink 
Military Operations Research, Found=1, Selected=1 
Buckshaw, D. Mission oriented risk and design analysis of critical information systems 2005 Ingentaconnect 
Security & Privacy, IEEE, Found=1, Selected=1   
Evans, S. Risk-based systems security engineering: stopping attacks with intention 2004 IEEExPlore 
Requirements Engineering Journal, Found=4, Selected=3 
Fabian, B. A comparison of security requirements engineering methods. Requirements Engineering, 2010 SpringerLink 
Sindre, G. Eliciting security requirements with misuse cases  2005 ACM 
Antón, A A requirements taxonomy for reducing Web site privacy vulnerabilities 2004 SpringerLink 
Toval, A.  Requirements Reuse for Improving Information Systems Security: A Practitioner’s Approach 2001 Citeseerx 
Journal of Object Technology, Found=2, Selected=2 
Firesmith,D. Specifying reusable security requirements. 2004 www.jot.fm 
Firesmith,D. Security use cases. 2003 www.jot.fm 
Computers & Security, Found=1, Selected=0 
Gritzalis, D. Principles and requirements for a secure e-voting system. 2002 Sciencedirect 
Software Engineering, IEEE Transactions on. Found=3, Selected=1  
Breaux,T.  Analyzing Regulatory Rules for Privacy and Security Requirements 2008 ACM 
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Haley, C.B. Security Requirements Engineering: A Framework for Representation and Analysis. 2008 IEEExPlore 
Rolland, C. Guiding goal modeling using scenarios. 1998 IEEExPlore 
Computer Standards & Interfaces. Found=3, Selected=2  
Mellado, D. A common criteria based security requirements engineering process for the development of 
secure information systems. 
2007 Sciencedirect 
 Massacci,F. Using a security requirements engineering methodology in practice: The compliance with the 
Italian data protection legislation 
2005 Sciencedirect 
Bhavani,T. Security standards for the semantic web  2005 Sciencedirect 
Computer Communications. Found=1, Selected=0  
Lambrinoudaki
s, C. 
 Security requirements for e-government services: a methodological approach for developing a 
common PKI-based security policy. 
2003 Sciencedirect 
International Journal of Computer Applications. Found=1, Selected=1  
Salini, P. A Knowledge-oriented Approach to Security Requirements for an E-Voting System. 2012 www.ijcaonline.org 
Informatical journal. Found=1, Selected=1  
Susi, A.  The tropos metamodel and its use. 2005 http://www.troposproject.org 
International Journal of Information Security. Found=1, Selected=1 
Giorgini, P. Requirements Engineering for Trust Management: Model, Methodology, and Reasoning.  2006 IEEExPlore 
Journal of systems and software. Found=1, Selected=1 
Mouratidis H. A framework to support selection of cloud providers based on security and privacy requirements. 
 
2013 Sciencedirect 
 Journal of Research and Practice in Information Technology. Found=1, Selected=1 
Lasheras, J. Modelling Reusable Security Requirements Based on an Ontology Framework 2009 Google scholar 
Information and Software Technology. Found=1, Selected=0 
Maamar, Z.  Towards an ontology-based approach for specifying and securing Web services 2006 sciencedirect 
Journal of Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems. Found=1, Selected=0 
 Kaga,L.  Modeling Conversation Policies using Permissions and Obligations  2005 ACM 
Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence. Found=1, Selected=0 
Tan,J.J. Dynamic security reconfiguration for the semantic web 2004 sciencedirect 
Conferences  Found =70, Selected =39 
ARES. Found= 12 ,  selected  selected =6 
Beckers, K. Comparing Privacy Requirements Engineering Approaches 2012 IEEExPlore 
Beckers, K Using Security Requirements Engineering Approaches to Support ISO 27001 Information Security 
Management Systems Development and Documentation 
2012 IEEExPlore 
Karpati, P. Characterising and Analysing Security Requirements Modelling Initiatives 2011 IEEExPlore 
Kárpáti, P.  Experimental Comparison of Misuse Case Maps with Misuse Cases and System Architecture 
Diagrams for Eliciting Security Vulnerabilities and Mitigations 
2011 IEEExPlore 
Okubo, T. Effective Security Impact Analysis with Patterns for Software Enhancement 2011 IEEExPlore 
Zuccato, A.  Service Security Requirement Profiles for Telecom: How Software Engineers May Tackle Security.  2011 IEEExPlore 
Langer, L.  A Taxonomy Refining the Security Requirements for Electronic Voting: Analyzing Helios as a 
Proof of Concept 
2010 IEEE Computer society  
Schmidt, H. Threat- and Risk-Analysis During Early Security Requirements Engineering 2010 IEEExPlore 
Hatebur, D.  A Pattern System for Security Requirements Engineering.  2007 IEEExPlore 
Asnar,Y. From Trust to Dependability through Risk Analysis. 2007 IEEExPlore 
Mellado, D. A comparison of the Common Criteria with proposals of information systems security requirements 2006 IEEExPlore 
Giorgini, P.  ST-tool: a CASE tool for security requirements engineering. 2005 IEEExPlore 
AINA, Found=1, Selected=1 
Tsoumas,B. Towards an Ontology-based Security Management  2006 IEEExPlore 
CAiSE, Found=2 , Selected=2 
Paja, E.  Modelling Security Requirements in Socio-Technical Systems with STS-Tool 2012 Google scholar 
Mouratidis, H. Integrating security and systems engineering: Towards the modelling of secure information 
systems.  
2003 Citeseerx 
COMPSAC; Found= 1 , Selected=0 
Elahi,G. Security Requirements Engineering in the Wild: A Survey of Common Practices 2011 IEEExPlore 
CSEE&T. Found= 1 , Selected=1 
Mead, N.R Security Requirements Engineering for Software Systems: Case Studies in Support of Software 
Engineering Education 
2006 IEEExPlore 
ETRICS, Found= 1 , Selected=1 
Hatebur, D. Security Engineering Using Problem Frames. 2006 SpringerLink 
EEE. Found= 1 , Selected=1  
Marti, R. Security specification and implementation for mobile e-health services. 2004 IEEExPlore 
ENASE. Found=1 , Selected=0 
Semmak, F. Extended Kaos to Support Variability for Goal Oriented Requirements Reuse 2010 SpringerLink 
 FIRA - STA. Found=1, Selected=1  
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Chikh, A. An Ontology Based Information Security Requirements Engineering Framework 2011 SpringerLink 
HICSS. Found=1, Selected=0   
Goluch, G. Integration of an Ontological Information Security Concept in Risk-Aware Business Process 
Management 
2008 IEEExPlore 
ICSE. Found= 3, Selected =3  
Best, B., Model-Based Security Engineering of Distributed Information Systems Using UMLsec. 2007 IEEExPlore 
Firesmith,D. Engineering Safety and Security Related Requirements for Software Intensive Systems.  2007 IEEExPlore 
Van 
Lamsweed 
Elaborating security requirements by construction of intentional anti-models. 2004 IEEExPlore 
ICSOC. Found=1, Selected=0 
Deubler,M. Sound development of secure service-based systems 2004 Citeseer 
ICICS. Found=1 , Selected=1  
Jensen, J.  Experimental Threat Model Reuse with Misuse Case Diagrams. 2010 SpringerLink 
IFIP TC9/WG9.6, Found=2, Selected=1 
Tsoumas,B. Security by ontology; A knowledge centric approach  2006 SpringerLink 
Rannenberg, 
K.  
Recent Development in Information Technology Security Evaluation-The Need for Evaluation 
Criteria for Multilateral Security. 
1993 ACM 
iTrust. Found=1, Selected=1  
Vraalsen, F. The CORAS Tool for Security Risk Analysis. 2005 SpringerLink 
 MoDELS, Found=2, Selected=2  
Saeki, M. Security Requirements Elicitation Using Method Weaving and Common Criteria 2009 SpringerLink 
Hogganvik, I. A graphical approach to risk identification, motivated by empirical investigations. 2006 SpringerLink 
NIK. Found=1, Selected=1  
Sindre, G. Capturing security requirements through misuse cases.  2001 Google scholar 
RE. Found =24, Selected=6 
Morali, A.  
 
Risk-based Confidentiality Requirements Specification for Outsourced IT Systems 2012 IEEE Computer society  
 
Paja, E.  STS-tool: Socio-technical Security Requirements through social commitments 2012 IEEExPlore 
Supakkul, S. An NFR Pattern Approach to Dealing with NFRs 2010 IEEExPlore 
Eunsuk,K.  Dependability Arguments with Trusted Bases 2010 IEEExPlore 
Ameller, D. Dealing with Non-Functional Requirements in Model-Driven Development 2010 IEEExPlore 
Hill, J.  Creating Safety Requirements Traceability for Assuring and Recertifying Legacy Safety-Critical 
Systems 
2010 IEEExPlore 
Xiping,S. Experiences in Developing Quantifiable NFRs for the Service-Oriented Software Platform 2009 IEEExPlore 
Teng, L.  AVT Vector: A Quantitative Security Requirements Evaluation Approach Based on Assets, 
Vulnerabilities and Trustworthiness of Environment  
2009 IEEExPlore 
Jureta, I.J. Revisiting the Core Ontology and Problem in Requirements Engineering  2008 IEEExPlore 
David,C. Balancing Security Requirements and Emotional Requirements in Video Games 2008 IEEExPlore 
Pichler, M. Agile Requirements Engineering for a Social Insurance for Occupational Risks Organization: A 
Case Study 
2006 IEEExPlore 
Juan, P. C.  Managing Non-Technical Requirements in COTS Components Selection 2006 IEEExPlore 
Gonzalez-
Baixauli, B.  
Eliciting Non-Functional Requirements Interactions Using the Personal Construct Theory 2006 IEEExPlore 
 Chisan, J.  Exploring the role of requirements engineering in improving risk management 2005 IEEExPlore 
Cohene, T.  Contextual Risk Analysis for Interview Design 2005 IEEExPlore 
Kaiya, H. Identifying Stakeholders and Their Preferences about NFR by Comparing Use Case Diagrams of 
Several Existing Systems 
2004 IEEExPlore 
Haley, C.B. The Effect of Trust Assumptions on the Elaboration of Security Requirements 2004 IEEExPlore 
Lin, L. Using abuse frames to bound the scope of security problems 2004 ACM 
Lin, L. Introducing abuse frames for analysing security requirements. 2003 Citeseerx 
Liu, L.  Security and privacy requirements analysis within a social setting.  2003 IEEExPlore 
Steve, L.  The journay toward secure systems: Achieving Assurance 2003 IEEExPlore 
Ian, A. Initial industrial experience of misuse cases in trade-off analysis 2002 IEEExPlore 
Wojtek,K. Requirements, Architectures and Risks 2002 IEEE Computer society  
Gene, S. The Hidden Meta-Requirements of Security and Privacy 2001 IEEExPlore 
REFSQ. Found=3, Selected=3   
He, Q. A Framework for Modeling Privacy Requirements in Role Engineering. 2003 http://www4.ncsu.edu 
Sindre, G. A Reuse-Based Approach to Determining Security Requirements. 2003 Citeseerx 
Sindre, G.  Templates for Misuse Case Description 2001 Citeseerx 
SAFECOMP. Found=1, Selected=1 
Grünbauer, J. Modelling and Verification of Layered Security Protocols: A Bank Application. 2003 SpringerLink 
SKG. Found= 1, Selected=0 
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Vorobiev, A. Security attack ontology for web services 2006 IEEExPlore 
Sicherheit. Found=1, Selected=1 
Gürses, S. F Contextualizing Security Goals: A Method for Multilateral Security Requirements Elicitation 2006 DBLP 
SIN. Found= 1, Selected= 0 
Parkin, S. E.  An Information Security Ontology Incorporating Human-Behavioural Implications 2009 ACM 
TrustBus, Found=1, Selected=1 
Pavlidis, M.  Trustworthy Selection of Cloud Providers Based on Security and Privacy Requirements: Justifying 
Trust Assumptions 
2013 IEEE Computer society  
TRUST. Found=1, Selected=1 
Vrakas, N. Privacy Requirements Engineering for Trustworthy e-Government Services. 2010 SpringerLink 
TOOLS-PACIFIC. Found=1, Selected=1 
Sindre, G.  Eliciting security requirements by misuse cases 2000 IEEExPlore 
UML. Found=2, Selected=2 
Jürjens, J. Automated verification of UMLsec models for security requirements. 2004 Citeseerx 
Lodderstedt, 
T. 
SecureUML: A UML-Based Modeling Language for Model-Driven Security 2002 ACM 
WWW. Found=1, Selected=1 
Martí, R. Security in a wireless mobile health care system.  2003 Google scholar 
Workshops, Found =21, Selecetd = 11 
ASIACCS. Found=1, Selected=0  
Fenz, S. Formalizing information security knowledge 2009 Citeseerx 
CAiSE workshops. Found=1, Selected=0  
Massacci, F. An Extended Ontology for Security Requirements 2011 SpringerLink 
DEXA. Found=1, Selected=1 
Hatebur, D. A Security Engineering Process based on Patterns. 2007 IEEExPlore 
ESORICS. Found=1, Selected=1 
Mellado, D. Applying a Security Requirements Engineering Process. 2006 SpringerLink 
EDOCW. Found=1, Selected=0 
Naufel do 
Amaral, F.  
An ontology based-approach to the formalization of information security polocies 2006 IEEExPlore 
EWSA. Found=1, Selected=0 
Schmidt, H. Preserving Software Quality Characteristics from Requirements Analysis to Architectural Design. 2006 IEEExPlore 
MARK. Found=1, Selected=1 
Salinesi, C. Using the RITA Threats Ontology to Guide Requirements Elicitation: an Empirical Experiment in 
the Banking Sector. 
2008 IEEExPlore 
NSPW. Found=1, Selected=0 
Raskin,V. Ontology in information security: a useful theoretical foundation and methodological tool 2001 ACM 
OTM. Found=1, Selected=1 
Daramola, O. Ontology-Based Support for Security Requirements Specification Process 2012 Springer 
RePa. Found=1, Selected=1 
Daramola, O.  Pattern-based security requirements specification using ontologies and boilerplates 2012 IEEExPlore 
RISI. Found=1, Selected=0  
Beckers,K. An Integrated Method for Pattern-Based Elicitation of Legal Requirements Applied to a Cloud 
Computing Example. 
2012 DBLP 
RHAS. Found= 2, Selected=1 
Firesmith,D. A Taxonomy of Security-Related Requirements 2005 Citeseerx 
Lee, S.W. Engineering Dependability Requirements for Software-intensive Systems through the Definition of 
a Common Language  
2005 Citeseerx 
SecSE. Found=1, Selected=0  
Seeger,M. M.  A Comparative Study of Software Security Pattern Classifications 2012 DBLP 
SESS. Found=3, Selected=2  
Lee S.W. Building problem domain ontology from security requirements in regulatory documents 2006 ACM 
Haley, C.B.  A framework for security requirements engineering.  2006 open.ac.uk 
Mead, N.R. Security quality requirements engineering (SQUARE) methodology 2005 ACM 
SAC. Found=1, Selected=1 
Jürjens, J. Using UMLsec and goal trees for secure systems development.  2002 ACM 
Spattern. Found=1, Selected=1 
Fernandez, 
E.B.  
Measuring the Level of Security Introduced by Security Patterns.  2010 IEEExPlore 
UKDU Workshop. Found=1, Selected=1  
Gürses, S. Multilateral security requirements analysis for preserving privacy in ubiquitous environments 2006 Citeseer 
WSCS. Found=1, Selected=0 
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